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Abstract
Engineering project outcomes are driven by a
dynamic mix of the social physics of teams, the unique
complexities of the engineering challenge at hand, and
stakeholder pressures in context. Various related
research has demonstrated formal experiments for
tightly controlled problems in small teams, including
work in organizational psychology, computational
organization theory, design thinking, and coordination
science. We realize there is room for testing these
foundational
concepts
in
quasi-controlled
environments with distributed teams challenged by
problem, solution, and organization complexity
common today. This paper presents a quasi-experiment
to study how engineers proceed through attention,
decision, and learning cycles in the design of a System
of Systems. The experiment utilized an ensemble of an
agent-based model, a decision-support interface, and a
variety of sensors to record behavior and activity. Four
pilots for a maritime industry challenge were
conducted with experienced industry experts, followed
by a primary experiment for data collection. Though
this work is preliminary, the experimental approach
detects (for this case) how designers focused on
different variables (attention), manipulated variables
to accomplish desired outcomes (decisions), and
explored the system performance trade space variously
over time to reveal false assumptions and uncover
better decisions (learning). Lessons learned from this
quasi-experiment are guiding this research team to
prepare scalable and reproducible engineering
teamwork experiments that include sensors of events
over time in the problem, solution, and socials spaces
of engineering projects.

1. Background
This research is rooted in observations of
engineering as a social activity across a team of teams
as they explore fundamental and often counterintuitive
tradeoffs. [1] In a stable environment, with teams,
markets, and technologies
well
understood,
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engineering can be characterized as a drive to
efficiency through an analytic process, improved with
decreasing uncertainty over time. Tacit capabilities and
mental models for successful teams remain aligned
with internal and external realities. However, for
modern, disruptive, and strategic industrial needs,
engineering is much the opposite, proceeding by
innovation under uncertainty.
Innovation is a collective capability, involving
individual behaviors and group dynamics. Design is a
crucial component of innovation. One example of how
social behavior affects design decisions is the manner
in which designers engage with each other to frame
and re-frame the design problem itself, which
subsequently influences solutions [2], [3].
A team’s mental models can limit their capacity for
awareness during complex work. Organization
processes, including those for engineering teams, have
been proposed to assess, refresh, expand and make
explicit the mental models of coordinating teams. [4]–
[9]
While a century ago organizations were conveyed
as structured, centrally controlled entities; that view
has given way in recent decades to a more natural
representation. Kozlowski and others have articulated
teamwork in an organization as distributed and
dynamic, and thus our models and research on
organizations must be multi-level. As such, a mix over
time of elements, relationships, topology, externalities,
and dynamics leads to organization as system with
performance as an emergent outcome. [10], [11]
Supported by advances in artificial intelligence,
operations research, and computational organization
theory, models of teams and organizations are
simulated, allowing virtual experiments to validate,
question, and expand existing ethnographic and
management frameworks. [12]–[15] While there have
being increasing variants and interesting explorations,
relatively few of these models for engineering
teamwork have been validated with reproducibility at
real world scale.

Page 349

Recently, with the advent of low-cost pervasive
sensors and digital twin models, a research opportunity
has risen to supplement existing frameworks and
formal experiments with a broader empirical basis.
[16]–[18] The motivation of this research is to build
quasi-experiments for real-world engineering project
teams supported by digital models and sensors as
instrumented teamwork.

1.1. Research Framing
We characterize design challenges as being
composed of the problem space, solution space, and
social space. A broad motive is to systematically
observe how the social space influences or perhaps
even governs how teams navigate the links between
problems and solutions. In other words, we wish to
study how the social physics of engineering teams
influences design process and outcomes [19].
These perspectives build on the information
processing view of innovation and learning in project
organizations [13], [20]. With change, old information
loses relevance, uncertainties arise, and new
information is generated. The position and value of
information across the network of the organization
evolves. Information new to actors in a given situation
may be a surprise [21]. The relevance of new
information is not proportional to volume, but a value
given topological significance of the knowledge. [22]
Small facts may yield big insights with systemic effect.
How the organization frames the problem and potential
solutions may encourage exploration and recognition
of these surprises. [3]
An alternative framing for design behavior is
Berglund & Leifer’s [23] Triple-Loop model (process,
product, and context) variables, building on Argyris’s
(1977) Double Loop model of learning [24].
A social space is viewed through the position and
interaction of teams of both individuals and other
teams (Team of Teams – ToT). Some researchers have
sought to measure the quality of the social space
through constructs such as collective intelligence (or C
factor) [25] or the Interaction Dynamics Notation
(IDN) [26]. These efforts are among the first to
develop a cognitive-behavioral model of engineering
design team performance. Of particular interest in the
literature on innovation is the role of influence cycles
[18] in team interactions and the impact on what teams
focus on (attention), how they arrive at choices
(decisions), and how they improve on past choices
(learning) [27].
In this ongoing experimental study, we focus on the
idea that the design process is path-dependent. We seek
to study how the latent social behaviors associated with

path-dependent exploration influence design choices
and outcomes in complex system engineering [1], [28].
Path-dependence in a design trade space is
explained as follows. Engineering teams begin at a
legacy position in the tradespace, determined by the
prevailing solution to the problem, tacit knowledge,
and influenced by externally determined specifications.
Teams then move through the space, attempting to
successively improve on the previous positions, i.e. do
better than where they have been. They eventually
converge to final choices either by arriving at a pareto
location, or satisfying requirements under resource
constraints. The phenomenon of the design walk – the
path moving through the design space -- can be
observed and is akin to project shaping [29]. However,
many underlying latent behaviors such as attention,
decision, and learning that govern the exploration
process have until recently been difficult to observe
and influence.
A Platform for Quasi Experiments: We realize
there is room for testing these foundational concepts in
quasi-controlled environments with distributed teams
challenged by problem, solution, and organization
complexity common today. We refer to this level of
complexity as the meso-scale, in contrast to microscale experiments with individuals and small teams and
macro-scale experiments relying on population scale
data. This paper presents a quasi-experiment to study
how engineers proceed through attention, decision, and
learning cycles in the design of a System of Systems.
We pose the following research questions to link the
unobservable / latent behaviors in the social space to
the observable events in the problem and solution
spaces:
a) Attention allocation – how do individual and
team behaviors influence the particular design variants
that teams focus on as they proceed? What are the
social signals and factors to which the designers are
attuned in relation to this focus set of variants?
b) Decision – how do teams evaluate and process
their design moves by either progressing or regressing
through the space? What interactions result in
agreement, or a choice?
c) Learning – how do teams recognize, process and
engage over the trade-offs that result from design
decisions, and how do they alter them to improve upon
previous choices?
Our methodology and approach are accordingly
structured to observe how individuals and teams
behave at the individual and collective levels [25],
[30], [31], so that patterns of attention, decision, and
learning that influence path-dependent design
tradespace exploration are revealed.
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2. Methodology & Approach
2.1. Experimental Platform
Improvements in computation and sensing have
now made it possible to study the activities of
engineering using a platform that combines models and
experiments. Such a platform enables (i) the
deployment of complex computation to the edge, i.e.
where individuals and teams can use distributed
devices to handle complex computation in near realtime, (ii) enable visualization of complex design
tradespaces to support trade-off evaluation and
decision-making, and (ii) instrument individuals and
their environment to observe individual and team
interaction and behavior.
These technologies promise to minimize the
cognitive burden on individuals trying to process
complex information, which is a major concern in the
engineering of complex systems [32]. An objective in
the deployment of these technologies is to free up
cognitive and emotional capacity for individuals to
engage in meaningful exchange of insights as they
explore the tradespace. Recent studies have
demonstrated that this experimental approach requires
model development as both boundary object for
engagement and as support for instrumentation and
observation [33], [34].

2.2 Design Challenge Setting
We formulated an engineering challenge for teams
of teams (ToT) as part of a commercial maritime
cluster of companies and a national laboratory. The
cluster consists of stakeholder representatives
(Figure 1) from the Japanese shipping industry -cargo suppliers and buyers, ship owners and operators,
infrastructure assets owners including ports and
bunkering facilities, regulatory system principals, and
the ship building sector (designers and builders).

The challenge for these stakeholders (the team of
teams) is to re-design the integrated marine system to
comply with revised emissions reduction regulations
enacted by the IMO MARPOL (International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships).
The decisions necessary to invest and change the
industry are dependent across actors and therefore
require coordination. This revision of the regulation
mainly sets limits for Sulphur Oxides (SOx) and
Nitrous Oxides (NOx) emissions from ships’ exhausts,
and will go in effect in 2020. Thus the new regulations
create performance targets; participants must study
how design variants trade-off other performance
dimensions to meet the newly specified performance
targets.
Teams are asked to modify a reference crude oil
shipping system involving a tankers’ fleet composed of
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs), currently fueled
with Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) and transporting crude oil
from a supply port in the Persian Gulf to a delivery
port in Japan.
The challenge addresses the expected progressive
transition from the currently predominant use of HFO
to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), and considers the
LNG infrastructure needed to support this transition.
The design goal is to reduce SOx and NOx emissions,
while fulfilling shipping contracts, at the lowest
possible cost (Table 1). Individuals representing
various stakeholders consider, enumerate, and evaluate
feasible system architectures in a tradespace simulated
in a computer model. Designers seek the Pareto
frontier of non-dominated architectures, and choose a
subset of preferred architectures.
Table 1. System performance metrics in the design
exercise
Objective
Emissions
Reduction

Description
Ability of the system
to reduce emissions,
in respect to baseline
emissions of HFO
combustion.

Schedule

Ability of the system
to meet the contract
schedule for crude
oil shipping, with
minimal disruption.
The cost of
installation of new
LNG bunkering
facilities, and
retrofitting crude oil
tankers.
Cost of operating the
retrofitted crude oil
tankers fleet, incl.
voyage.

CAPEX

OPEX

Figure 1. Maritime shipping stakeholder landscape

Metrics
NOx
Emissions
SOx
Emissions
CO2
Emissions
Waiting
Time
Cargo
Moved

Units
Ton/ Ton
Cargo * km
Ton/ Ton
Cargo * km
Ton/ Ton
Cargo * km
%

Initial Cost

MUSD

Fuel Cost
Efficiency

USD/
Cargo Ton
* km

Cargo Ton

Page 351

Table 4. Experiment variables mapped to teamwork
tasks and phenomena

2.3 Quasi-Experiment Setup
A quasi-experiment based on the maritime
transition design challenge was established (Table 2).
In the exercise, designers can modify designs to
achieve one or more variants by playing with a limited
set of architectural decisions. These decisions and
options for each decision are represented in a
morphological matrix. For the crude oil shipping
system these include propellant fuel for the fleet of
ships, engine and overall propulsion system
architecture, fuel tank and vessel layout, fuel bunkering
and refueling implications, berth flexibility options and
levels (Table 3).
Table 2. Experiment variables
Dependent: Emissions (NOx, SOx, CO2), Waiting
Time, Cargo Moved, Initial Cost, Fuel Cost Efficiency
Independent: Number of architectures enumerated,
Attention allocation to the problem space, Attention
allocation to the solution space, Number of path dependent
sequences, Number of surprises, Timestamps

Teamwork
Task
Collective
interpretation
of design goals
and definition
of strategy
Collective
enumeration of
architectures

Teamwork
Phenomena
Attention
Allocation
Decision
Attention
Allocation
Decision

Collective
consideration
and evaluation
of architectures

Attention
Allocation

Collective
selection of
best
architecture

Attention
Allocation

Learning

Decision

Controlled: Time limit, System of systems model,
Demographics (No randomization, quasi-experiment)
Table 3. Matrix of design variables and levels
Decision
# Ships HFO
# Ships LSFO
# Ships LNG
# Ships HFO/LNG
LNG Bunkering
Location

Alternatives

LNG Bunkering
Method

Truck
to Ship

# LNG Bunkering
Facilities by
Location

0

0

5

Persian
Gulf

Singapore.
Ship
to
Ship
1

15

20

Japan

-

Shore
to
Ship

-

3

-

The design challenge variables were selected based
on the research questions to be explored, the typical
tasks of design teams, and the associated teamwork
phenomena mapped in Table 4.
The quasi-experiment was developed through a
series of four pilot experiments with experienced
industry professionals at sites in the USA and Japan.
The pilot experimentation phase also served for
prototyping the computer simulator that implements
the system of systems (SoS) model and the interactive
visualization software user interface.

Experiment Variables
Attention allocation on
elements of the problem
space
System performance
metrics priorities
Attention allocation on
elements of the solution
space
Number of architectures
enumerated
Attention allocation on
Elements of the
problem space
Number of path
dependent sequences
Number of surprises
Attention allocation on
elements of the problem
space
System performance
metrics from selected
architecture

2.3 Tradespace Simulation
MOSES is an agent-based simulator developed by
Wanaka for the evaluation of architectural decisions in
ship transportation systems. [35] The simulator was
developed based on specific technical and physical
realities of the ship, shipping, and port for the case in
the experiment. The simulation was then improved
through the pilot experimentation phase specifically for
this exercise.
There are five types of agents and five types of
demands (Table 5). Agents have four functions: (i)
observe, (ii) select, (iii) checkNextEvent, and (iv)
update. For each iteration of the simulation, agents
observe their status and task list according to the
demand, select their next task, and estimate the next
event.
Table 5. Types of agents and demands in MOSES
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Further to the computer simulator MOSES
introduced here, the experiment developed is
instrumented and aided by several other software
packages, the most significant of them being the socalled Maritime Decision Support System (DSS).
The Maritime DSS software is a package of open
source software developed by Winder. It enables
teams engaged in the design problem to generate and
evaluate architectures with enhanced visualization
features. It provides a UI that augments a team’s
understanding of the problem and the solution spaces,
as well as the underlying system model of the
simulator and its assumptions. During the experiment,
socio-metric data is collected passively while the teams
engage in solving the design problem.
Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the UI. The lefthand toolbar allows users to configure and simulate a
unique shipping fleet. The right-hand toolbar allows
users to explore seven dimensions of KPIs (the system
performance objectives or -ilities). The KPI plot
(lower right) allows users to track and revisit the
performance of multiple scenarios over time in a
tradespace format.
The Maritime DSS has a module called “Team
Space IO” for analysis of “fingerprints” data collected
(Figure 3). By cross-referencing fingerprint data with
other time-stamped observations about intention,
behavior, and/ or strategy, we can verify or preclude
research hypotheses.

Figure 3. Sensor output interface for Maritime DSS
system

3. Experiment Results
3.1. Attention Allocation by Teams
Attention allocation on the variables of the problem
space can be sensed by recording how much time a
tradespace variable was set or remained set to a certain
system performance objective.
The major objectives subject of attention in this
experiment have been Fuel Cost, Cargo Moved and
Initial Cost. The following Figure 4 provides the
distribution of attention into the different trade
variables in the very moment that a team performed a
simulation or a recall.

Figure 4. Tradespace variables on which teams
focused
Figure 2. Maritime DSS UI

We focus on two broad categories of data:
● Attention: We measure attention by knowing
what subset of information (i.e. KPIs) users are
viewing over time. We can also view which inputs are
changed.
● Performance: Performance is evaluated relative
to other teams and relative to a simulated tradespace.

The results documented in Table 6 show that there is a
variance in how teams allocated attention to variables.
Table 6. Attention Allocation on Variables of the
Problem Space for different Teams
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Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of attention into
the possible trade-offs between objectives by different
teams. Some teams evaluated architectures from more
viewpoints (checked more types of trade-offs) than the
other teams.

3.2. Decisions by Teams
The design goal of the exercise was to reduce SOx
emissions and NOx emissions, while fulfilling shipping
contracts, at the lowest possible cost. Figure 7 plots
the time series of the outcomes for a sample of
different teams. Team 1, 2 and 4 have a very large
number of data points, while Team 3 and 5 have much
less.

Figure 5: Joint variables on which teams focused

Figure 6 provides an aggregated view of the
density of categories of changes through time by
different teams.

Figure 7. Performance variable changes over time
by each of 5 teams; team 1 at top (red), team 5 at
bottom (purple)
Figure 6. Architectural Changes by Teams over
Time

A few teams seem to have concentrated more on
changing bunkering infrastructure options rather than
on ship portfolio options, while the other teams seem
to have had a more balanced distribution of focus on
design inputs. This can also be observed in the
following Table 7, which shows the dominant areas of
attention.
Table 7. Attention Allocation on Variables of the
Solution Space for different Teams

Teams interpreted the design goals differently. The
Post-survey collected from each team identifies the
design strategy followed for this experiment:
● Team 1 (red): “Maximize Cargo Moved and
minimize Fuel Cost, while keeping Emissions as low
as possible”.
● Team 2 (green): “Decrease Fuel Cost, with a
compromise on Emissions and Cargo Moved”.
● Team 3 (blue): “Minimize Emissions and longterm operation cost”.
● Team 4 (yellow): “Maximize revenue first, and
achieve lower SOX/NOX as a secondary goal. To this
end, we identified that the main variables contributing
to revenue were Cargo moved, Fuel cost, and capital
cost. Our model is (roughly) Revenue = CM - FC –
CC”.
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● Team 5 (purple): “Maximize Cargo Moved, and
minimize Fuel Cost and Capital Cost, while keeping
Emissions reduction reasonable”.
In terms of design strategies, the teams approached
the design walk differently:
● Team 1 considered/ enumerated new
architectures, evaluated them and then compared them
with (recalled) previous architectures in cycles,
converging to their selected architecture.
● Team 2’s design walk shows that they simulated
many times and did not use the recall function. It is
not clear how many of the simulations are in effect
actually a recall without further analysis.
● Team 3’s design walk shows they simulated
fewer architectures and recalled a few times.
● Team 4 attempted to generate the simulated
tradespace, analyzed it (through recalls), defined
design goals, and selected an architecture.
● Team 5’ design walk shows they simulated fewer
architectures and recalled only a handful of times.

3.2. Learning Cycles by Teams
A method used in this quasi-experiment to detect
and analyze learning cycles is illustrated with a
detailed review of Team 1. The nature of the surprises
encountered, the associated outcomes, and subsequent
changes are visualized.
A learning cycle is defined as a process by which a
team considers, evaluates, and reflects about design
choices. Learning cycles are characterized by the
encounter of surprises followed by a set of changes in a
sequence as the team explores in response to the new
information in the surprise.
Identification of learning cycles of teams is
performed by detecting when and why design teams
encounter surprises while carrying out a design task,
and reviewing the design changes they execute. The
changes are driven by design goals. Mental models of
the team evolve with the new information obtained and
the associated reflection and reframing that happens
after encountering a surprise. When a team fixes design
variables after having encountered a surprise (i.e. after
having learned something new about system dynamics)
then continues exploring changes to other design
variables, we speak about a path-dependent sequence
of design solutions. The new design solutions tested
may be dependent on insights derived from previous
design solutions. This procedure has been applied to
four different teams in the frame of two design
workshops.
Table 9. Definitions for identifying learning cycles
Variable
Surprise

Description
Indicates the point in time in their design walk
when a team encountered a surprise.

Variable
Architecture

Recorded Reasons
for Surprise

Potential Learning
and likely decision
in course of action
Subsequent
Changes until next
Surprise

Description
The system configuration, a set of design
decisions, that was considered and evaluated
when the team encountered the surprise.
The reasons the team judged the outcomes
different than expected. A surprise is
encountered when system performance is
better or worse than expected.
What the teams possibly learned about the
specific system dynamics and what they
probably decided for the next moves in their
design process.
The type of design changes that the team
explored until the time they encountered
another surprise in their design process.

Figure 8 provides the time series of outcomes and
design changes, whereby the architectures enumerated
(i.e. the time that an architecture considered was first
simulated -marked with asterisks), and recalled (i.e. the
times that an architecture previously enumerated was
recalled -marked with red dots) are highlighted.
Learning cycles are plotted as black lines
connecting the asterisks. Phases of the design walk are
identified in the figure as follows: (1) is an exploratory
phase, whereby mental models were likely initially
confirmed or challenged. In this initial phase we can
see fewer recalls, as there are fewer architectures to be
recalled, and the first systemic surprises/ learnings
emerge. In this phase we also see more testing of both
Ship Portfolio and Bunkering options; (2) comprises an
analysis phase, where there is higher density of recalls
(i.e. comparison between architectures) and where
path-dependent sequences are established. In this
phase we also see more testing of bunkering options;
(3) appears to be a deliberation phase, including a 4min
pause before 11 am; (4) indicates a fine-tuning phase,
with some last new architectures and very high density
of recalls from the array of LNG and Dual Fuel hybrid
fleet options, i.e. testing of Ship Portfolio details with a
fixed bunkering decision; ending in (5) a final decision
phase characterized by a 7min pause and some recalls.
Table 8. Features of architecture selected by Team 1

A first path-dependent sequence of Ship Portfolio
(incl. 10xDual-fueled ships) seems to have been
triggered by Surprise 5 (the first time the selected
architecture was considered). This surprise likely
caused a reframing about the positive effects of
designing for a half fleet of LNG ships. This is
identified in Table 10. The elements of surprise are
highlighted with yellow circles (i.e. Better performance
than anticipated in all variables), and the associated
path-dependent sequence with a yellow rectangle.
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Figure 8. Analysis of design walk showing phases, surprises, and sequences across design & performance
variables
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The second path-dependent sequence is triggered
by Surprise 2 (i.e. Shore-to-Ship too high an
investment), after which most of the design walk
considers Ship-to-Ship configurations, with some
checks on Truck-to-Ship, on an attempt to verify a
significant reduction in Initial Cost (Surprise 7). The
related outcomes that resulted different than
anticipated are marked with pink circles (i.e. Worse
Cargo Moved, Fuel Cost, and Initial Cost than
anticipated), and the Ship-to-Ship bunkering choices
made thereafter can be seen in the sequences marked
with a pink rectangle.
A third path-dependent sequence is triggered by
Surprise 6 (i.e. Further investigate 10LNG/10Dual
configurations).
This surprise likely caused a
reframing about the effect of including any number of
HFO ships in a fleet, thereby confirming the Ship
Portfolio configuration of the selected architecture.
Surprise 6 on Worse Emissions than expected has been
marked with a blue circle and the associated sequence
of Ship Portfolio choices with a blue rectangle.
A fourth path-dependent sequence is triggered by
Surprise 9, however the insight was first discovered at
Surprise 5 (i.e. Bunkering in Singapore could work
too.). This confirms the location of the bunkering
point in Singapore. Surprise 9 (Worse Cargo Moved,
and Fuel Cost than anticipated) is marked with green
circles, and the path-dependent sequence with a green
rectangle.
Regarding the number of bunkers, it could be
argued that the team had a pre-existing mental model
that supported one bunker configurations (most of their
architectures considered feature one or no bunkers).

Sur- Previous Arch.
priCurrent Arch.
se

Recorded Potential Learning and Changes
Reasons for likely decision in course until next
Surprise
of action
Surprise

7

Worse
Initial Cost
than anticipated

Team wrote: “Not
huge benefit in capital
cost by changing to
truck to ship, should
keep ship to ship”
Continue exploring
bunkering
configurations incl.
Ship-to-Ship.

Changes
in
Bunkering

Worse
Cargo
Moved,
and Fuel
Cost than
anticipated

1 bunker in Singapore
seems a good option.

Changes
in
Bunkering

5x HFO, 5x LNG, 10x
Dual.
1x Bunker (SG), Shipto-Ship
10x LNG, 10x Dual.
1x Bunker (PG), Shipto-Ship
1x Bunker (JP), Truckto-Ship

9

10x LNG, 10x Dual.
3x Bunker (PG), Shipto-Ship
3x Bunker (JP), Truckto-Ship
10x LNG, 10x Dual.
3x Bunker (SG), Shipto-Ship

Continue exploring
bunkering.
Note: Team wrote:
“Didn't change cargo
moved, fuel costs
higher than 1 bunker in
Singapore”.

3.4. Team Performance
Teams were ranked based on the performance of
their selected architectures. For every trade-off, each
architecture is compared to the others in the two
objectives of the trade-off. The comparison consists of
a simple estimate of the distances between the one
architecture subject of analysis and the best performing
architecture in both of the trade-off objectives.

Table 10. Key surprises in Team 1’s learning cycle
Sur- Previous Arch.
priCurrent Arch.
se

Recorded Potential Learning and Changes
Reasons for likely decision in course until next
Surprise
of action
Surprise

2

Worse
Cargo,
Fuel Cost,
and Initial
Cost than
anticipated

Shore-to-Ship too high
an investment.
Explore other
bunkering methods.

Changes
in Fuel
and
Bunkering

Better than
anticipated
in all
variables

Good candidate.
Continue exploring
hybrid fleet
combinations.
Continue exploring
bunkering
configurations incl.
Ship-to-Ship.

Changes
in Fuel
and
Bunkering

Worse
Emissions
than anticipated

Team wrote: “Capital
cost not changing
huge, NOx and SOx
went up, SOx same”
Do not further
consider fleets incl.
HFO. Further
investigate
10LNG/10Dual config.

Changes
in
Bunkering

5

6

20x HFO
10x LNG, 10x Dual
1x in PG, Shore-toShip
1x Bunker (JP), Shoreto-Ship
10x LSFO, 10x Dual
1x Bunker (PG), Shipto-Ship
1x Bunker (JP), Shipto-Ship
10x LNG, 10x Dual
1x LNG (SG), Ship-toShip
10x HFO, 10x Dual
1x Bunker (PG), Shipto-Ship
1x Bunker (JP), Ship-toShip
5x HFO, 5x LNG, 10x
Dual
1x Bunker (SG), Shipto-Ship

Figure 9. Selected architecture performance plotted
on Cost, NOx, Cargo, and Fuel tradespaces.

The selected trade-offs are the most likely that the
teams considered in their design walks, according to
their statement of design principles (goals), and the
attention allocation data collected. Every trade-off is
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equally weighted, so that a “Global Rank” is calculated
simply aggregating the “Trade-off Ranks”.
In cases were the distances are similar, distances to
an imaginary point that would be non-dominated have
been calculated. That is the case with Team 3 and
Team 4’s solutions in Cargo Moved vs. Fuel Cost, and
Team 3 and Team 5 in NOx Emissions vs. Fuel Cost.
This is shown in Figure 10, the intent is to illustrate
possible easy ways to calculate relative ranks.

Emissions (and even dominate Team 3’s solution).
Another example is with NOx Emissions vs. Fuel Cost,
whereby we can see the same on NOx Emissions and
both Team 1 and 2 dominate Team 3’s solution. Then,
it could be argued that Team 1, 2 and 5’s higher
performance ranking than Team 3 is justified.

4. Key Findings
For this maritime cluster expert workshop, a model
and simulation of the system, the marine crude oil
shipping industry, was effective in enabling teams to
enumerate possible design variants and to visualize the
tradeoffs of various configurations.
To assess cognitive behavioral aspects, during 4
pilots workshops and one quasi-experiment this
research prototyped methods for instrumenting the
individual’s attention allocation processes. We also
observed decision-making and learning aspects of the
attention-decision-learning cycle of influence. These
sensors and the quasi experiment platform are work in
progress.

Figure 10. NOx vs. Fuel Cost by Team. Distances to
an imaginary non-dominated point in team 3 & 5’s
solutions.
Table 11. Performance ranking

4.1. Proposed Hypotheses
This quasi-experiment leads the authors to propose
a more formal exploration of five testable hypotheses
(shown in Figure 12). The units of analysis are
individuals and teams.
Do higher-performing teams explore more through
their design walks than lower performing teams?
H1: Higher-performing teams enumerate more architectures
than lower performing teams.
Do higher-performing teams learn more through their
design walks than other teams?
H2: Higher-performing teams encounter more surprises
than lower performing teams.
H3: The design walk of higher-performing teams contains
more path-dependent sequences of systemic relevance, than
the design walk of lower performing teams.
Do teams with clear goals learn more through their
design walks than teams with unclear goals?
H4: Teams that agree on clear design goals encounter more
surprises than teams with unclear goals.

According to this performance assessment, Team 1,
2, 4, and 5 performed better than Team 3. However,
Team 3 was the only team that stated slightly different
design goals giving Emissions Reduction a higher
priority than the other teams.
We observe that even on NOx Emissions vs. Initial
Cost, Team 1, 2, and 5 perform better on NOx

Do teams that approach design problems from different
perspectives learn more through their design walks than
teams with narrow perspectives?
H5: Teams that focus their attention on more problem
variables encounter more surprises, than teams that spread
their attention over fewer problem variables.
Figure 11. Testable hypotheses

The quasi-experimental results – not conclusive by
themselves - provide insights for a preparation of
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scaled experiments with controlled testing of
hypotheses. In this case:
H1: Higher-performing teams enumerate more
architectures, than lower performing teams.
Teams 1, 2, and 5 enumerated 17, 14, and 18
architectures, respectively, while Team 3 enumerated 6
architectures only. Team 4 is excluded from this
evaluation, as they approached the design challenge in
a fundamentally different way than the other teams.
H2: Higher-performing teams encounter more
surprises, than lower performing teams.
Teams 1, 2, and 5 recorded 14, 7, and 10 surprises,
respectively, while Team 3 encountered 4 only. Team
4 recorded 5 insights through their analysis, but once
again, it is difficult to compare this figure with the
others because of the different approach they followed.
H3: The design walk of higher-performing
teams contains more path-dependent sequences of
systemic relevance, than the design walk of lower
performing teams.
This hypothesis addresses the idea that higherperforming teams learn more through their design
walks, than lower performing teams.
This hypothesis could not be evaluated, as only
Team 1’s design walk was studied in depth.
H4: Teams that agree on clear design goals
encounter more surprises, than teams with unclear
goals.
In the main experiment, all teams seem to have
defined more clear design goals at the outset of the
challenge, as opposed to what was observed in the
previous pilot experiment, and the attention allocation
data confirms these goals, except for Team 3.
While Team 3 mentioned a design goal in
minimizing Emissions, we observe that Team 3’s
attention allocation data indicates a higher focus on
Cargo Moved (not Emissions). This finding suggests
that Team 3 did not focus on their agreed design goals.
This could be verified by reviewing the audio files.
H5: Teams that focus their attention on more
problem variables encounter more surprises, than
teams that spread their attention over fewer
problem variables.
In this quasi-experiment, the higher performing
teams explored more of the tradespace than lower
performing teams.

4.2. Discussion and Lessons
The team performance ranking method used in this
thesis project should be reviewed, and more precise
algorithms developed. Rather than only surprises, one
can explore more types of learning events, as we have
seen that not only unexpected results can trigger

reflection and learning. Consolidation of insights might
also be considered as a learning event.
Machine audio analysis proved infeasible in the
experiment conditions, making “manual” analysis the
only way to index the recordings. Alternative methods
for audio analysis should be developed. Sentiment
analysis of audio files could be implemented, whereby
validation of surprises could be obtained. Possibly,
non-disruptive video recording tools could be tested for
capturing/ validating team’s mood correlating it to the
timestamp of surprises.
All steps of the experiment procedure (incl.
registration, pre-survey, and post-survey) should be
integrated within one platform that makes the
experiment participation seamless. Further work
should also focus on the scalability and reproducibility
of experiments in an industrial setting for collection of
larger amounts of data.

4.3. Future Work
Based on ongoing and future work we will report in
detail on the chosen approach to instrumentation, early
results, implications for subsequent rounds of
experiments and the consistency of observations with
other recent literature. We will also lay out the specific
testable hypotheses we intend to test before launching
an at-scale, reproducible experiment.
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